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Transfer Taxes and Household Mobility:  
Distortion on the Housing or Labor Market? 
 
Abstract 
 
We estimate the effect of the UK Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) – a transfer tax on the 
purchase price of property or land – on different types of household mobility using micro 
data. Exploiting a discontinuity in the tax schedule, we isolate the impact of the tax from 
other determinants of mobility. We compare homeowners with self-assessed house values on 
either sides of a cut-off value where the tax rate jumps from 1 to 3 percent. We find that a 
higher SDLT has a strong negative impact on housing-related and short distance moves but 
does not adversely affect job-induced or long distance mobility. Overall, our results suggest 
that transfer taxes may mainly distort housing rather than labor markets. 
JEL classification: D23, H21, H27, J61, R21, R31, R38. 
Key words: Transfer taxes, stamp duty, transaction costs,  
homeownership, household mobility. 
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1. Introduction 
Most developed countries impose a tax on transactions of property and land. This tax – in 
North America often labelled ‘land transfer tax’ and in Britain ‘stamp duty’ – increases the 
transaction costs associated with the sale of a property and therefore increases the costs of 
moving for homeowners. This cost increase can be expected to negatively affect the 
propensity to move. Thus, the tax is prone to have adverse effects on housing and labor 
markets. Households may not live in the type of dwelling and the location that most closely 
match their preferences. Similarly, individuals may be less willing to accept new jobs that are 
not within commuting distance or they may decide to hold on to a current job that is a less 
good match than another available job further away. Given these potential adverse effects 
caused by mismatch in housing and labor markets, the question of whether, and to what 
extent, the tax reduces household mobility is highly policy relevant.  
Transfer taxes and in particular the UK Stamp Duty Land Tax (SDLT) – commonly referred 
to as ‘stamp duty’ – have long been criticized by economists as being inefficient. The 
Mirrlees Review (2011) highlights the fact that the SDLT “creates a disincentive for people 
to move house” (p. 403) and the adverse consequences of this on the functioning of housing 
and labor markets. To date, however, little is known about the nature of the moves (short vs. 
long distance or housing- vs. job-related) that are most strongly adversely affected. This is the 
key focus of our study.  
The UK stamp duty scheme in place until December 3, 2014 provides an ideal setting to 
explore the impact of transfer taxes on mobility decisions. This is partly because the tax 
liability was quite substantial, at least for more expensive housing (the top rate until 
December 3, 2014 was 7 percent, levied on the entire purchase price), and partly because the 
stamp duty liability jumped sharply at various cut-off values, providing various 
‘discontinuities’ that can be exploited empirically.1 Our analysis focuses on a discontinuity – 
or ‘notch’ – where the stamp duty jumps particularly strongly. This notch – at £250k – allows 
us to isolate the impact of the stamp duty from other determinants of mobility.  
Basic economic intuition and simple theoretical considerations suggest that different types of 
moves may be differentially affected by the stamp duty. This is because benefits from 
moving are likely larger for more momentous – employment- or life event-related – mobility 
shocks than for more gradual changes in life-cycle circumstances – which typically move 
homeowners away incrementally from their optimal location and housing consumptions. Our 
theoretical considerations yield three empirically testable predictions: (i) At the house value 
cut-off of £250k, as a consequence of the tax notch, household mobility should decrease; (ii) 
The adverse impact of the notch should be greater for (more incremental) short distance 
moves than for (more momentous) long distance ones; and (iii) The adverse effect should be 
greater for (more gradual) housing-related than for (more momentous) job-related moves.  
To test these predictions, we use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and 
compare homeowners with self-assessed house values on either side of the cut-off, while 
                                                          
1
 The reform from December 3, 2014 removed these discontinuities. 
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controlling for flexible but smooth functions of house values. Consistent with our theoretical 
priors, we find that the SDLT has a significant negative effect on household mobility. 
Moreover, this adverse effect is confined to short distance moves and to moves that are 
housing-related. We find no significant effect on job-related moves and we find little 
evidence that the stamp duty adversely affects moves that are triggered by major ‘life events’ 
such as divorce or retirement. We document these key results both visually and using 
rigorous regression analysis. 
Our core estimate indicates that the 2 percentage-point increase in the SDLT reduces the 
annual rate of mobility by 2.6 percentage points. This is a substantive effect given that the 
estimated counterfactual mobility rate in the group affected by the tax rate increase is only 7 
percent. It equates to a 37 percent decrease in mobility. The corresponding welfare loss in the 
form of distortions in the housing market is very substantial. Based on our central point 
estimate, simple calculations imply that the welfare loss associated with the rate increase 
from 1 to 3 percent could be in the range of about 40 to 80 percent of the additional revenue 
generated by the tax increase. 
In conducting our analysis we faced a number of empirical challenges. Some of these are 
specific to our underlying data and research design. A key concern is that homeowners with 
higher underlying propensity to move may be better informed about the stamp duty and may 
therefore be more likely to report the cut-off value rather than a value slightly above (i.e., 
sorting of homeowners close to the cut-off could partially drive our findings). Another 
potential sorting mechanism is that households that are interested in moving may attempt to 
keep the value of their house below the cut-off by neglecting renovation. To address these 
potential sorting issues, we drop households that self-report the cut-off value (or values very 
close to it) in a robustness check. Our results become less precise but the key findings 
regarding differential impacts of the stamp duty on different types of mobility remain clear. 
We also carried out a battery of ‘balancing tests’ to check for sorting of households with 
different characteristics around the cut-off. In addition, we perform a robustness check where 
we limit the sample to households who responded in the survey that they would like to move. 
For this sub-sample, sorting based on unobserved willingness to move should be a lesser 
concern. Our key findings are robust to all these checks. 
Overall, our results confirm the findings of the previous literature that transfer taxes are 
highly distortive in that they substantially reduce mobility. The main novel contribution of 
our study is that we demonstrate that these distortions are largely confined to short distance 
and housing-related moves.  
Two strands of the economics literature motivate our analysis. The first strand is the existing 
literature on the impact of transfer taxes on household mobility. Transfer taxes are an 
important part of housing transaction/moving costs and they are the most important 
component directly determined by policy makers. Despite this, little is known about their 
effect on mobility. On the theoretical side, Lundborg and Skedinger (1999) modify 
Wheaton’s (1990) seminal search model of the housing market by adding transfer taxes into 
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the framework. They derive that the lock-in effects of the tax reduce welfare, with the 
adverse effect being larger at low vacancy rates and smaller with a buyer tax. The latter is 
because the buyer tax-induced price reduction dampens the negative effect on search effort 
caused by the tax. Nordvik (2001) analyzes the mobility effects of transfer taxes in a 
theoretical dynamic life-cycle model of housing demand. He finds that a transfer tax rate of 
2.5 percent decreases the number of moves by the model household over the life cycle from 
three to one, implying substantial dead-weight losses. 
On the empirical side, Van Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn (2005) provide indirect evidence 
on the mobility effects of transfer taxes using individual panel data for the Netherlands. They 
estimate a competing risks hazard model of moving to renting or owning with house values 
as an explanatory variable and use a theoretical model to infer the effect of transaction costs. 
Their results suggest that a 1 percentage-point increase in the value of transaction costs—as a 
percentage of the value of the residence—decreases residential mobility rates by at least 8 
percent.  
Dachis et al. (2012) utilize the introduction of land transfer taxes in Toronto to estimate their 
effect on the housing transaction volume and prices with a Differences–in-Differences 
approach, comparing market outcomes across the boundary of the affected area.
2
 According 
to their estimates, a 1.1 percent land transfer tax led to a 15 percent decrease in transactions 
in the first eight months after the introduction. The implied welfare loss relative to an 
equivalent property tax is about $1 for every $8 in tax revenue. 
Discontinuities in transfer tax schedules have recently attracted increasing attention as a 
source of insight into how the tax affects market outcomes. Most closely related to the 
present paper, Best and Kleven (2015) utilize (i) administrative data on all property 
transactions in the UK, (ii) the discontinuities in the UK schedule to study price responses 
and (iii) changes in the tax schedule over time to study the effect on the transaction volume. 
Best and Kleven (2015) provide evidence of a strong negative price effect. In addition, they 
document that a temporary 1 percentage-point cut in the tax rate – due to the 2008-9 stamp 
duty holiday on houses worth between £125,001 and £175,000 – led to a 20 percent increase 
in transactions. The bulk of this impact is explained by a long term reduction in sales rather 
than the timing of purchases.  
Besley et al. (2014) exploit the same 2008-9 stamp duty holiday to estimate the incidence of 
a transaction tax on housing. Their key findings are twofold. First, around 60 percent of the 
“surplus” due to the tax holiday accrued to buyers. Second, the tax holiday increased 
transactions of properties by about 8 percent but this effect was only short-lived. The effect 
reversed rapidly after the policy was withdrawn.  
In a similar vein – exploiting a tax notch imposed by New York’s so called ‘mansion tax’ – 
Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) find robust evidence of substantial bunching (both buyers and 
sellers have strong incentives not to transact near the threshold). Moreover, they document 
                                                          
2
 See also Dachis (2012) for follow-up work using a longer data period. 
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that the incidence of the mansion tax falls on the seller, may exceed the value of the tax, and 
cannot be explained by tax evasion.  
Davidoff and Leigh (2013), finally, explore the incidence of transfer taxes using data from 
Australia where the marginal tax rate rather than the average tax rate jumps at various cut-off 
prices. They use past local house prices and national house price inflation to construct an 
instrumental variable for the transfer tax rate. Their results indicate that a higher tax rate 
reduces turnover and – in line with Kopczuk and Munroe’s findings (2015) – the incidence of 
the tax is on the seller.  
The second strand of the literature that motivates our analysis explores the link between 
homeownership and labor market outcomes. It is a well-established fact that homeownership 
induces significant barriers to mobility – transfer taxes are one important component of such 
barriers. In a seminal paper Oswald (1996) argues that homeownership, by reducing mobility, 
increases unemployment. Moreover, he provides cross-country evidence consistent with this 
conjecture. Subsequent studies (e.g., Van Leuvensteijn and Koning, 2004; Munch et al., 2006 
and 2008; Battu et al., 2008) that use individual-level panel data and more rigorous 
estimating techniques, by and large, confirm Oswald’s conjecture that homeowners are less 
mobile. They rebut, however, the hypotheses that homeowners are more likely to become 
unemployed or have longer unemployment spells.
3
  
Coulson and Fisher (2009) explore a number of theoretical mechanisms that may affect the 
link between homeownership on the one hand and mobility and labor market outcomes on the 
other hand. They point out that different theoretical models can have very different 
predictions about the labor market at both micro and aggregate level. Their findings suggest 
that homeowners are less likely to be unemployed but they also have lower wages than 
renters. At the aggregate level, higher regional homeownership rates are associated with a 
greater probability of individual worker unemployment and higher wages.  
Finally, Ferreira et al. (2010 and 2011) point out that there may be an asymmetry in the 
mobility response of homeowners depending on whether or not they are in negative equity. 
Whereas their findings indicate that homeowners in negative equity are indeed less likely to 
move, other empirical studies (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2011; Coulson and Grieco, 2012) reach the 
conclusion that homeowners who are under water are slightly more likely to move than 
homeowners with positive equity. 
                                                          
3
 Van Leuvensteijn and Koning (2004) find no evidence that homeowners change jobs less than tenants. They 
conclude that the housing decision is driven by job commitment (and not the reverse) and that homeowners are 
less vulnerable to unemployment. Munch et al. (2006) point out that homeowners may set lower reservation 
wages for accepting jobs in the local labor market. Hence, they are more likely than renters to find jobs locally. 
Munch et al. (2008) have argued, from a search theoretic perspective, that homeowners should have a lower 
transition rate into new non-local jobs and therefore should stay longer in their jobs. Battu et al. (2008) suggest 
that there are differential effects across tenure types and that it matters whether the starting point is employment 
or unemployment. Their findings imply that homeownership is a constraint for the employed and public renting 
is more of a constraint for the unemployed. 
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The general lesson learned from this literature is that policies that make households less 
mobile may harmfully affect the performance of housing and labor markets. Our study 
contributes to this literature by demonstrating that transfer taxes prevent moves driven by 
more incremental life cycle changes (such as short distance and housing-related mobility) but 
they do not preclude moves driven by more momentous shocks (long distance and job-related 
mobility). 
2. The UK stamp duty system and theoretical considerations 
The stamp duty on transactions on property and land was introduced in the UK during the 
1950s. We focus on the system of stamp duty on residential transactions that had been in 
place until December 3, 2014. 
The stamp duty is paid by the buyer and is a percentage share of the purchase price of the 
house. The economic incidence, however – in line with the literature discussed in Section 1 – 
can be expected to mainly fall on the seller.  
The defining feature of the UK stamp duty system (i.e., the one in place until December 3, 
2014) is a progressive schedule where the tax rate for the whole purchase price goes up at 
certain thresholds. Table 1 reports the tax schedule that applies during our sample period: 
Houses sold for up to 125,000 are exempt from stamp duty, but from £125,000 upwards the 
tax rate rises in a stepwise manner from 1 to 5 percent.
4
  
Our empirical analysis focuses on the second cut-off at £250,000 where the tax rate increases 
from 1 to 3 percent. We do so because stamp duty payable increases significantly at the cut-
off (from £2,500 to £7,500)
5
, and because our data is reasonably dense around the £250k cut-
off.
6
 Significant variation in stamp duty liabilities and large sample size together make it 
possible to detect the effects of the stamp duty on mobility. 
When households make their relocation decisions they take into account expected benefits as 
well as expected costs of moving. Basic economic intuition suggests that the stamp duty 
increases these costs.
7
 When buyer and seller bargain over the agreed transaction price, a 
                                                          
4
 A new higher “mansion” tax rate of 7 percent (or 15 percent for corporate bodies) was introduced for 
properties over £2 million on 22 March 2012. A tax ‘holiday’ was in place on properties worth between £125 
and £175 during 2008-9. None of these changes affected the notch we investigate. 
5
 At the £125k cut-off the treatment is much weaker as the tax liability rises only by £1,250. Moreover, this cut-
off is subject to various regional exemptions and we do not know whether the survey respondents in our BHPS 
sample are subject to such an exemption. 
6
 Lack of density around the cut-offs rules out using the thresholds of £500k and £1m. We also note that while 
the jumps in tax liability are £5k and £10k, respectively, for these two cut-offs, these jumps are smaller in 
‘relative terms’ as only fairly high income and wealthy households will be able to afford to buy houses worth 
over £500k and especially over £1m.  
7
 A household move does not necessarily induce a housing transaction. Households may hold on to their old 
homes and rent them out, while at the same time buying new ones. This is not very common, however, in part 
because (i) many households need the sales proceeds for their next down-payments, (ii) most homeowners do 
not want to be landlords, and (iii) certain housing stock (single-family housing) may be more suitable for owner-
occupation (Linneman, 1985). Hence, the effect of transaction taxes on mobility and on transactions is in 
practice closely correlated. Transfer taxes may also affect the propensity that households choose to become 
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transaction can only occur if the buyer’s valuation of the seller’s house exceeds the seller’s 
valuation by a sufficiently large margin to overcome the transfer tax. If the transfer tax 
increases, the propensity of a transaction decreases implying a lower likelihood that the seller 
moves.
8
 These considerations yield our first empirically testable prediction: At the house 
value cut-off of £250k, as a consequence of the stamp duty tax notch, household mobility 
should decrease (Prediction 1).  
We would expect that the magnitude of the adverse effect of the stamp duty on mobility 
depends on household specific circumstances. Homeowners who face gradual changes in 
their life-cycle circumstances – which move them away incrementally from their optimal 
locations and housing consumptions – may be strongly discouraged from moving as a 
consequence of a jump in the stamp duty. This is because the benefits of moving often only 
exceed the costs by a narrow margin; a leap in the stamp duty renders these moves nonviable. 
In contrast, the relocation decisions of homeowners who face rarer but more momentous – 
typically employment-related – mobility shocks may be less affected by an increase in the 
stamp duty: Employment-related large mobility shocks, especially if there are no suitable 
jobs available locally, tend to trigger substantial benefits arising from relocation and these 
often exceed the stamp duty-induced costs of moving by a wide margin.
9
 The corresponding 
empirical predictions are that the adverse effect of the stamp duty increase on household 
mobility should be greater for shorter distance moves than for longer distance ones 
(Prediction 2) and for housing-related as opposed to job-related moves (Prediction 3).
10
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data 
The data used in this study is derived from the BHPS. The BHPS follows roughly 10,000 
households over time. We use data from 1996 to 2008, which is the last year available.
11
 The 
surveys for each wave are conducted between September and March. We define our ‘year’ 
variable as the year when data collection started.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
homeowners (and, possibly, the aggregate housing consumption over their life cycle). Households – especially 
those with a short expected duration – can be expected to become renters because the moving costs are high. 
The effect of the transfer tax on tenure choice is a question that should be explored in future work. 
8
 This simple economic intuition could be formalized in a Nash bargaining framework that models utility as a 
function of amenities and income opportunities. Such formalization is beyond the scope of this paper. 
9
 We note however that localized amenity shocks are not necessarily smaller than income shocks. For example, 
Linden and Rockoff (2008) show that prices of homes near sex offenders decline considerably following an 
offender’s arrival in the neighbourhood.  
10
 Prediction 2 is reinforced by the fact that costs related to different types of moves likely differ: Long distance 
moves, such as moving to another labour market area, may entail higher psychic costs due to a loss of existing 
social networks, than moves related to adjustments of housing consumption in the same area (see Kennan and 
Walker, 2011). If the underlying relocation costs are higher, the stamp duty represents a relatively smaller 
addition to the cost and therefore it is likely that the stamp duty affects long distance moves to a lesser extent 
than short distance ones. 
11
 The BHPS was subsequently replaced by the Understanding Society survey and there was a break in the 
panel. 
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In addition to a rich set of household characteristics, the dataset includes the owner-
occupiers’ assessments of the value of their homes and information on whether the household 
moved in the subsequent year, making it an ideal dataset to study the impact of transfer taxes 
on household mobility. The exact question on which the self-assessed house value is based is: 
“About how much would you expect to get for your home if you sold it today?” If the 
household gives a range, the interviewer will report the lowest figure in that range.  
The self-assessed house value variable is effectively discrete in nature. In theory survey 
respondents could state any value. In practice however there are observations only at 147 
values within the broadest band we use (£150k to £350k). 97.7 percent of the observations 
are concentrated at values divisible by £5k. We round house values up to the closest value 
divisible by £5k and use this variable in our econometric analysis to avert issues related to 
statistical inference discussed in Section 3.2.  
In our empirical analysis we essentially compare households reporting house values above 
the 250k cut-off, where the stamp duty tax rate jumps from 1 to 3 percent, with households 
with self-reported values below the cut-off. We limit the sample to owner-occupiers with 
self-assessed house values within 20, 30 or 40 percent of the £250k cut-off value (+/- £50k, 
+/- £75k and +/- £100k, excluding endpoints).  
One limitation of our analysis is that the mobility status of the last wave (2008) is not known. 
Thus, the estimation sample consists of data from 1996 to 2007. Finally, we exclude 
households that moved into their current dwelling between year t-2 and t. We do this because 
recent movers can be expected to be overrepresented below the £250k cut-off which could 
bias our estimates (see the discussion in Section 3.2).  
Figure 1 Panel A shows the distribution of self-assessed house values in 2006. Overall, 
people tend to report round values divisible by £50k. There is a clear spike at £250k, but this 
spike does not stand out from the other round values. Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates the 
distribution of actual transaction prices in the UK in 2006 from a data set obtained from the 
Land Registry. We expect to observe a pile-up in the transaction price distribution at £250k 
because houses that would sell for up to £255k absent of the tax rate notch will sell for 
£250k. This is indeed what the figure reveals. The bunching at the threshold is clearly much 
more pronounced in the transaction price distribution depicted in Panel B of Figure 1 than in 
self assessed house values. The fact that there is no abnormal pile-up at the cut-off in Panel A 
of Figure 1 supports the validity of our empirical strategy. 
Treatment variable 
Our treatment variable is a dummy that equals one if the self-assessed house value of 
household i in year t exceeds £250k, Treatit = D(House valueit > 250k). We argue that the 
likelihood that the household’s moving decision is affected by the 3 percent tax rate rather 
than the 1 percent rate increases drastically at, or in the vicinity, of this point. The self-
assessed value may not be an accurate measure of the actual value when a house is sold. 
However, the self-assessed value is arguably more relevant for our purposes as households’ 
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expectations regarding stamp duty payable upon sale are likely based on the self-assessed 
house value.  
Outcome variables 
Our outcome variable measures actual moves between the interview date and the subsequent 
interview. The variable Moveit gets the value one if the BHPS records classify the household 
as a mover household in t+1. We lose some observations due to attrition from the panel 
between t and t+1 but we were able to recover the value of the moving indicator for some 
non-respondent households by utilizing information in the sample record files of the BHPS. 
In addition to the overall mobility, we study different types of mobility separately by using 
information on the distance of move and main reasons of moving. 
We argue that a direct measure of household mobility is preferable to measures of housing 
transactions, used in most previous studies, when the interest is on the potential adverse 
impact of the transfer tax on the functioning of housing and labor markets. The crucial 
advantage of the BHPS with respect to our core research question is that it allows us to gain 
insight into the effects of transfer taxes by analyzing different types of moves. 
Round values  
Exploring the data suggests that households that report round house values divisible by £50k 
(£150k, £200k etc.) have a lower propensity to move. One might be concerned that 
households intending to stay do not follow the market as closely and give rough rounded 
estimates of the value of their house. The round value effect might bias our estimates if 
disproportionately many round values are in the treatment or the control group. To address 
this issue, we include a dummy variable for round house values divisible by £50k in the 
model as a control variable. 
Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis for the 
largest regression sample (40 percent band around the cut-off). The average house value in 
the sample is £220,000 and 4.4 percent of households moved within a year. To analyze 
whether different types of moves are differentially affected, we divide moves into two 
categories based on the distance of move: less than 10km, and 10km or more. In addition, we 
use information about the main reason for the move to construct three categories: ‘housing- 
and area-related’, ‘employment-related’ and ‘life event-related’. The categories are described 
in detail in Appendix Table A1. Housing- and area-related reasons are most common. Moves 
motivated mainly by job-related reasons seem to be rare. This may partly reflect how the 
survey question is formulated. Employment motives may still be important even if they are 
not the main reason for the move. Moving distance and main reason for move being 
employment related are strongly positively correlated and we think that by analyzing the 
distance of move we can gain additional insight into whether transfer taxes hinder relocation 
of the workforce. Less than one percent of short distance moves (defined as less than 10km) 
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but about 11 percent of moves beyond 10km are mainly job-related. Similarly, 56 percent of 
short distance moves but only 27 percent of long distance moves are mainly housing-related. 
Life event-related mobility is not strongly correlated with the distance of move. 
3.2. Empirical approach 
Obstacles to causal inference 
Our empirical approach exploits the fact that the stamp duty jumps substantially at the 
threshold of £250k. This discontinuity creates variation that can be used to isolate the impact 
of the stamp duty from confounding factors. Theory predicts that owners who possess homes 
that are worth less than £250k should be more likely to move than otherwise similar ‘treated’ 
owners with homes worth above £250k. In an ideal world, from an econometric point of 
view, house values would be exogenously determined and precisely measured. In such a 
setting, the treatment status is as good as random very close to the threshold. This is a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD) discussed in Lee and Lemieux (2010).  
Our empirical approach has the features of an RDD but differs from the ideal setting in 
important ways, creating obstacles to causal inference. First, our assignment variable is 
essentially discrete, which means that it is impossible to compare outcomes for households 
just above and just below the cut-off where the stamp duty increases (Lee and Card, 2008). 
We have to choose a functional form for the relationship between house values and mobility, 
and use observations both close and relatively far from the cut-off to estimate this 
relationship. We use data within 20, 30 or 40 percent of the cut-off value and approximate the 
relationship between mobility and house values through flexible but smooth functions 
(polynomials) of the self-assessed house value, which we include in the set of control 
variables. We do the latter to address the potential issue that other determinants of mobility 
correlated with house values might bias our results.  
A second obstacle to causal inference is that we cannot be sure whether all households that 
report house values above the limit are affected by the 3 percent tax rate (or whether 
households below the limit are affected by the 1 percent tax rate). Households that report 
house values close to the cut-off might attach some probability to being on the other side of 
the cut-off. People near the 250k cut-off are likely to have the same expectations about the 
sales price, so we might not expect to see a jump in behavior across this cut-off when 
focusing on observations very close to it. This implies that the treatment group indicator 
likely measures actual treatment status with error which would lead to attenuation bias 
towards zero.
12
 This attenuation bias should decrease and eventually disappear however when 
we compare house values further from the cut-off.  
                                                          
12
 Our empirical model resembles a reduced form of a fuzzy RD design. Standard fuzzy RD analysis uses a 
discontinuity in the likelihood of obtaining the treatment as an instrument for the actual treatment status in a 
Two-Stage-Least-Squares regression. This approach is not feasible with the BHPS data because there is no way 
to identify the treated households with certainty. 
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The third and arguably the most important obstacle to causal inference is the fact that in our 
setting the assignment variable – the self-assessed house value – is in principle a choice 
variable.
13
 Although survey respondents in the BHPS have no incentive to misreport the 
value of their home, both the actual value (quality) of the house and the reporting of the value 
can be influenced by the owner.  
This is an obvious concern for recent movers. These movers are disproportionately 
represented just below the cut-off because many houses sell at and just below £250k. To the 
extent that the recent mover status affects mobility, this may bias our estimates. Moreover, 
recent movers may be problematic for our research design in the sense that they can precisely 
choose the value of their house. Their ability to “precisely manipulate” the assignment 
variable can invalidate our research design. Due to these issues, we exclude households that 
moved into their current dwelling between year t-2 and t.
14
 We analyze the robustness of our 
findings to this sample restriction in a Web Appendix (Tables W1-W4). 
There are two further potential sorting mechanisms that could threaten causal inference. First, 
households that are interested in moving could try to keep the value of their house below the 
cut-off by neglecting renovation. Such behavior is unlikely to lead to drastic bunching below 
the cut-off because local demand and supply conditions are the main drivers of house prices 
and therefore precise manipulation through maintenance seems infeasible. To the extent such 
behavior nevertheless occurs, unobserved willingness to move may bias our estimates as 
households may sort based on this unobservable characteristic. Second, manipulation of the 
running variable can occur if people anticipate that it is difficult to sell the house just above 
the cut-off and therefore report self-assessed house values just to the left of the cut-off. This 
should show up as bunching at the cut-off value. If households that consider moving are 
better informed about the stamp duty cut-off, this may lead to sorting around the cut-off 
based on the underlying propensity to move. To the extent such sorting does indeed occur, 
this could create an upward bias in the estimated impact of the tax.  
To address these two sorting related concerns, we carry out extensive validity and robustness 
checks. First, we demonstrate that there is no abnormal mass in self-assessed house values 
below the cut-off (see Figure 1, Panel A), indicating that manipulation may not be a 
significant concern.
15
 Second, because potential manipulation would be likely to occur very 
                                                          
13
 The use of self-assessed house values instead of actual transaction prices (that actually determine the 
treatment) is partly a necessity in the context of our analysis. This is because we are interested in how transfer 
taxes affect the propensity of different types of moves occurring. The BHPS provides detailed information on 
the nature of the moves and on the intention of households whether to move, but it does not provide actual 
transaction price data. Moreover, self-assessed house values are available regardless of whether houses are sold, 
implying that we can determine the treatment status of all owner-occupier households.  
14
 We conducted balancing tests to determine the appropriate time window and find indication of sorting of 
households that moved between year t-2 and t. Hence, we dropped these households from our sample. We do 
not detect any discontinuity for less recent movers. The balancing tests are reported in Web Appendix Table 
W5. 
15
 McCrary (2008) type formal tests of discontinuity in the distribution of house values are not suitable with our 
data. This is because the strong concentration of the data in round values could be erroneously interpreted as 
manipulation. 
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close to the threshold, we test whether dropping observations near the threshold (“donut 
approach”) changes our conclusions. However, this is not the case. Third, we run balancing 
tests where we test for discontinuities in observable household characteristics at the 
threshold. Detecting such discontinuities would be indicative of sorting that could bias our 
results. However, we find little evidence for such discontinuities. Fourth, we test whether our 
results are robust to the inclusion of household characteristics as additional controls. This is 
indeed the case. Finally, we redo our analysis, focusing exclusively on a sub-sample of 
households that are willing to move. (We derive this information from a survey question.) For 
this subsample, sorting based on interest in moving should not be a concern. Our results are 
qualitatively very similar.  
Given the three obstacles to causal inference, one option could be to ignore values close to 
the cut-off entirely and focus solely on values further away as our main specification. For 
such a sample sorting and attenuation bias are not a concern. Including values close to the 
cut-off however has the advantage that treatment and control group are more similar in their 
characteristics and that we can estimate the treatment effect more precisely. Moreover, and 
importantly, all our validity and robustness checks are suggestive that sorting and attenuation 
bias are not driving our findings, advocating not dropping observations very close to the cut-
off. 
Empirical specification 
We estimate a regression model of a mobility dummy on a dummy for the self-assessed 
house value being above the £250k cut-off. We include a flexible but smooth function of 
house values in the set of control variables. We do this because other determinants of 
mobility could be correlated with the self-assessed house value, on which the treatment 
indicator is based. The house value variables are intended to pick up the impact of all 
determinants of mobility correlated with house values, apart from the stamp duty. 
Specifically, we estimate: 
 Moveit = βt+ β1Treatit+ f(House Valueit)+ uit , (1) 
where the dependent variable Moveit is the mobility indicator that gets the value one if 
household i moved between year t and t+1. The treatment variable takes the value one if the 
household’s self-assessed house value exceeds £250k. The function f(House Valueit) is a 1
st
 – 
4
th
 order polynomial of the self-assessed house value. In addition, we test the robustness of 
the results to allowing for different polynomials on either side of the cut-off. A dummy for 
round values divisible by £50k is included as an additional control.  
The identifying assumption of the model is that variable Treatit is uncorrelated with the error 
term conditional on f(House Valueit). This assumption is satisfied if other determinants of 
mobility develop smoothly with respect to house values and are therefore captured by the f 
function. The ability of households to precisely manipulate whether they are to the right or to 
the left of the cut-off could lead to discontinuities in other determinants of mobility and 
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invalidate the identifying assumption. The numerous validity and robustness checks reported 
in the results section are designed to dispel this concern.  
The main focus of our analysis is the differential impact of the stamp duty on different types 
of mobility. The assumption required for identifying the differential impacts is less stringent 
than for unbiased estimation of the impact on the overall mobility rate. This is because any 
endogeneity issues likely affect the estimates for different types of mobility similarly. Thus, 
even if the estimates for the magnitude of the effect were biased, qualitative conclusions 
regarding differences in the impact of the stamp duty on different types of moves likely 
remain valid.  
External validity 
If all households respond similarly to the stamp duty, our results for the £250k cut-off can be 
generalized to apply for the whole population in the UK and possibly tell us something about 
the effects of similar taxes in other countries as well. With heterogeneous responses, the 
results may apply to a smaller sub-population. Drawing on Lee and Lemieux (2010), our 
estimates can be interpreted as a weighted average of treatment effects of the British owner-
occupier households in the BHPS data. The weight of each household is the probability that 
their self-assessed house value falls within the band around the cut-off used in each 
specification we estimate. A further limitation to the external validity of our results is that we 
constrain the sample to households that have not moved during the two previous years. Thus, 
the sample is not representative of all homeowners.  
Statistical inference 
The panel property of the data and the lumpiness of the distribution of self-assessed house 
values have potential implications for statistical inference. Firstly, since the households in our 
sample are observed in multiple years, we have to account for within household correlation of 
the error terms through clustering by household. Another potential issue regarding statistical 
inference was pointed out by Lee and Card (2008), who discuss RD analysis with a discrete 
assignment variable. They argue that specification errors in the fitted regression line imply 
that at each discrete value there is an error component positively correlated within 
observations at that particular point, which means that standard errors are downward biased. 
They show that clustering standard errors by the values of the discrete assignment variable 
solves the problem. As explained above, we round house values up to the closest £5k 
multiple. We cluster the error terms at the household level and £5k house value group level in 
our analysis. In some cases, especially with the 20 percent band, two-way clustering produces 
lower standard errors than clustering at household level only. This is likely due to an 
insufficient number of house value clusters. In these cases, we report the higher of the two 
standard errors. In order to test whether our statistical inference might be biased, we run 
placebo tests where we apply our method to artificial cut-offs set at £5k intervals (between 
£150k and £350k), and show that we do not find overly many false significant coefficients.  
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3.3. Results 
We start with results on the impact of the stamp duty increase on observed household 
mobility. Figure 2 provides a descriptive analysis of mobility and illustrates our econometric 
results, with the circles depicting the mobility rate for £10k wide house value groups. The 
size of the circle is proportionate to the number of observations in the group. The line in 
Panel A of Figure 2 shows predicted mobility rates from model (1) with a 4
th
 order 
polynomial of house values, and the band around it represents the 95% confidence interval. 
Consistent with Prediction 1, the figure reveals that there is a clear downward shift in 
moving probability when the self-assessed house value exceeds £250k.  
Table 3 presents the corresponding estimates of the effect of the stamp duty with various 
specifications. Column 1 reports a naïve specification where we do not control for house 
values. Columns 2 to 5 report the results with 1
st
 to 4
th
 order polynomials of house values. 
Rows 1 to 3 use 3 different bands around the £250k cut-off: within 20, 30 and 40 percent of 
the cut-off value (+/- £50k, +/- £75k and +/- £100k, excluding endpoints). The Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) is shown in italics to assist specification selection (more negative 
values preferred).  
In column 1 of Table 3, the coefficient on the treatment indicator is close to zero and 
insignificant. Panel A of Figure 2 suggests that the effect of the stamp duty on mobility is not 
detected in this simple specification, because there is an underlying positive relationship 
between mobility and house values which offsets the negative effect of the tax rate increase at 
£250k. Accordingly, the coefficient on the treatment indicator becomes negative in all 
specifications when we control for the relationship between mobility and house values 
(columns 2-5). With the +/-20 percent band, the estimates are insignificant and vary from -
0.018 to -0.035. Using a wider band makes the estimates more stable and decreases the 
standard errors substantially. With the 30 percent band, the estimates vary from -0.026 to -
0.033 and are statistically significant. In row 3, using a 40 percent band around the cut-off, 
the range of the estimates is slightly wider than in the second row, but the estimates remain 
statistically significant with the exception of column 2 using a 1
st
 order polynomial. We take 
the specification with the 30 percent band and the 3
rd
 order polynomial of house values as our 
preferred specification. The band is wide enough for reasonably precise estimation but does 
not use data overly far from the cut-off. The 3
rd
 order polynomial is preferred because adding 
further polynomials increases the AIC score. Taken at face value, the point estimate of our 
preferred specification implies that the 2 percentage-point increase in the stamp duty rate 
reduces the propensity to move by about 2.6 percentage-points in absolute terms or by 37 
percent in relative terms.
16
 Most of our results are very similar with the 30 and 40 percent 
bands. In the figures describing mobility rates (Figure 2 and Appendix Figure A1) we use the 
                                                          
16
 The relative decrease in propensity to move was calculated by comparing the treatment effect estimate (2.6 
percentage points) in our preferred model specification to the predicted moving propensity (7 percentage points) 
in the treatment group absent of the treatment. The relative reduction in mobility is 2.6/7 = 37.1 percent. 
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40 percent band (with a fourth order polynomial) because it covers the whole range of 
observations used in our analysis. 
The various point estimates vary around our preferred estimate with the attached standard 
errors also varying around the standard error of the preferred estimate. Overall, our results 
provide strong supporting evidence that an increase in the stamp duty has a significant 
negative effect on household mobility.  
Distance and type of moves 
In the analysis that follows we explore the proposition that a given increase in the stamp duty 
should reduce mobility more strongly for homeowners who face gradual changes in their life-
cycle circumstances as opposed to momentous shocks.  
In Panels B and C of Figure 2, we explore whether the stamp duty more strongly reduces 
short distance moves than long distance ones (Prediction 2). We divide moves into two 
groups based on the straight line distance of move: less than 10 kilometers and over 10 
kilometers. (We later vary the threshold that defines ‘short distance’ and ‘long distance’ to 
check how sensitive our results are to this definition.) The shares of these groups in our 
sample of moves are 55 percent, and 45 percent. Figure 2 Panel B illustrates that there is a 
clear downward shift in short distance mobility at the cut-off, but in Panel C (long distance 
mobility) no such drop is seen, consistent with our theoretical considerations. 
Table 4 presents the corresponding econometric results for short and long distance moves 
with 20, 30 and 40 percent bands around the cut-off and 3
rd
 and 4
th
 order polynomials. The 
treatment effect estimates on short distance moves (columns 1 and 2) are negative in all 
specifications and highly significant with the 30 and 40 percent bands. The impact on long 
distance mobility (3
rd
 and 4
th
 columns) is insignificant in all specifications. 
The results imply that the overall effect found in Table 3 is solely driven by short distance 
mobility (less than 10km). Long distance mobility appears to be unaffected by the stamp 
duty. Our explanation for this finding is that short distance mobility is closely linked to 
incremental adjustments of housing consumption. A 2 percentage point increase in the stamp 
duty may outweigh the benefits of typical incremental housing consumption adjustments, 
such as buying one room more or less, but it may not outweigh the benefits associated with 
long distance moves. The latter are typically related to other important decisions, such as 
changes in employment or family status.
17
  
In Panels D to F of Figure 2, we explore the proposition that the stamp duty has a stronger 
impact on housing-related mobility than on mobility triggered by employment reasons or 
major life events (Prediction 3). We use information on the primary reason for moving to 
divide moves into three groups: 1) housing- and area-related, 2) employment-related, and 3) 
major life event-related. Table A1 describes how we constructed the categories. The share of 
                                                          
17
 Consistent with this conjecture, Buck (2000) finds that job-related moves in the UK tend to be over longer 
distances (across rather than within Local Authority Districts). 
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moves mainly motivated by job-related reasons is only about 5 percent, which makes it 
difficult to identify a separate effect on job-motivated moves. This issue notwithstanding, the 
figures are in line with our interpretation of the distance-of-move results in Table 4. There is 
a visible drop in mobility at the cut-off in Panel D (housing- and area-related mobility). 
Employment-related mobility (Panel E) and major life event-related mobility (Panel F) seem 
to be unaffected by the increase in stamp duty. 
The corresponding regression results for different types of mobility are presented in Table 5. 
Coefficients for housing- and area-motivated moves are always negative and statistically 
significant with 30 and 40 percent bands. The coefficients for job-related moves are close to 
zero and insignificant. The coefficient for life event-related mobility is negative in five out of 
six specifications but marginally significant in only one specification, indicating that the 
negative mobility effect of the stamp duty may not be attributable to a reduction in this kind 
of moves either.  
Donut approach  
As discussed in Section 3.2, the fact that the self-assessed house value is to some extent a 
decision variable implies that manipulation close to the cut-off is possible and may lead to 
sorting that would invalidate our research design. For example, households with high 
underlying propensity to move may be better informed about the stamp duty and may 
therefore be more likely to report £250k rather than slightly above £250k. In, addition likely 
movers might attempt to keep the value of their house below the cut-off by neglecting 
maintenance. As a test for whether possible sorting of households close to the cut-off might 
drive our results, we re-estimated the model dropping all households that self-report exactly 
£250k, £245k–£255k or £240k–£260k, respectively (i.e., we apply a “donut approach”). We 
use the 40 percent band because otherwise the remaining sample size is too small. Table 6 
reports the results for overall mobility and different types of mobility in Panels A to F. When 
we drop data close to the cut-off, the results remain similar to those reported in Tables 3 to 5, 
but become less precise than with the whole sample. While the results on overall mobility 
become only marginally significant or borderline insignificant depending on the sample used, 
our main finding that the stamp duty affects chiefly short distance and housing related 
mobility and not long distance and employment related moves is robust – both in terms of 
economic and statistical significance – to using the donut approach. 
Other validity tests and robustness checks 
A standard way of testing the validity of the RD design is to check if predetermined 
characteristics of households change significantly at the cut-off. If the flexible but smooth 
function of the assignment variable (self-assessed house values in our case) adequately 
captures other relevant factors, we should not observe changes in background characteristics 
of households at the cut-off. Moreover, sorting based on underlying propensity to move 
should show up as discontinuities in determinants of mobility at the cut-off. To test this, we 
estimate model (1) using several observed determinants of mobility as the dependent 
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variable. The variables used are: the age of the household head, dummy for kids, household 
income, two indicators of education (GCE A-levels or higher and bachelor degree or higher), 
a dummy for the household head being unemployed, and mobility between t-3 and t-2. 
Significant coefficients in these ‘balancing tests’ would suggest that the model specification 
is not sufficiently flexible to control for other determinants of mobility, or that households 
with different characteristics sort into different sides of the cut-off, which could invalidate the 
research design. The balancing tests for education are particularly important because in 
addition to being related to mobility, education may also be related to how well the household 
knows the stamp duty system. 
Table 7 presents the results of the balancing tests with 30 and 40 percent bands and a 1
st
 to 4
th
 
order polynomials of house values in Panels A to D. None of the covariates is correlated with 
the treatment variable with a 2
nd
 or higher order polynomial, which supports the validity of 
our analysis.  
One can argue that each individual attribute in Table 7 may be only weakly related to the 
households’ propensity to move, and therefore Table 7 may not provide convincing evidence 
of lack of sorting. We address this concern by first regressing mobility on the variables, and 
squares of continuous variables (age and income) in Table 7 and then using the predicted 
mobility from this model as the outcome variable in an additional set of balancing tests. The 
R
2
s of the regressions that generate predicted mobility vary between 0.016 and 0.020, 
suggesting that the bulk of variation in mobility is unexplained. This implies that one may not 
want to draw too strong conclusions from these tests. Appendix Figure A1 shows the 
relationship between the self-assessed house value and predicted mobility and the fit of the 
regression line of model (1) with a 40 percent band around the cut-off and 4
th
 order 
polynomial of house value. There is no visible discontinuity in predicted mobility at the cut-
off. Appendix Table A2 reports the results for other specifications. The coefficient of the 
treatment indicator is consistently negative, which may point towards possible sorting of 
more mobile households below the cut-off. However, the coefficient is statistically 
insignificant except in one specification (40 percent band and 3
rd
 order polynomial) and also 
the magnitudes are very small.  
As an additional test of whether our results might be driven by confounding factors correlated 
with the treatment indicator we include age, a dummy for kids, log of household income, a 
dummy for GCE A-levels or higher, a dummy for bachelor degree or higher, a dummy for 
being unemployed, a dummy for moving between t-3 and t-2 and region dummies (19 
regions) as control variables in model (1). Table 8 presents the results for overall mobility 
and different types of mobility with 3
rd
 and 4
th
 order polynomials of house values (Panel A 
and Panel B), and 30 percent and 40 percent bands around the cut-off. The coefficients on the 
treatment indicator are very similar to the specifications without the additional controls in 
Tables 3 to 5. This increases our confidence in the finding that the stamp duty decreases 
mobility, and that this effect is confined to short distance and housing- and area-related 
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mobility. The robustness of the results to observed determinants of mobility suggests that 
unobserved omitted variables are unlikely to bias our estimates significantly. 
We dropped those households that moved during the past two years from the estimation 
sample, because recent mover status (moved between t-2 and t-1 or t-1 and t) was not 
balanced at the cut-off. We report these balancing tests in a Web Appendix (Table W5). The 
evidence that the treatment status is related to mobility during the past two years may be 
symptomatic of sorting on some other (unobservable) factors. Thus, excluding recent movers 
may be only a partial solution to potential sorting issues. In the Web Appendix we analyze 
the sensitivity of our findings to the exclusion or inclusion of recent movers (Tables W1-
W4). It is reassuring to find that our results are largely unaffected by the inclusion of recent 
movers. The results on overall mobility become somewhat weaker when we include recent 
movers but the main finding is unchanged (both in an economic and statistical sense): short 
distance moves and housing related mobility are much more strongly affected by the stamp 
duty than long distance moves and other types of mobility. 
Another concern is that our statistical inference might be biased despite two-way clustering 
of standard errors at the household- and house value group-level or that our results might be 
driven by some irregularities related to the reporting of house values around round numbers. 
In order to test these possibilities, we run placebo tests with artificial cut-offs set at £5k 
intervals £150k, £155k, … , and £350k. We focus on specifications that use a 30 percent band 
around the cut-off and a 3
rd
 order polynomial of house values, and a 40 percent band with a 
4
th
 order polynomial. The placebo coefficients and their 95 percent confidence intervals are 
shown in Figures 3 and 4. In Figure 3 (4), only two (one) out of 40 placebo tests give 
significant coefficients. The fact that our method does not give significant coefficients at 
artificial cut-offs increases our confidence in the finding that the decrease in mobility at 
£250k is indeed caused by the 2 percentage-point increase in the stamp duty at the cut-off.  
We carried out a number of additional robustness checks, the results of which we report in 
various Appendix Tables. To begin with, our findings largely survive even when we limit the 
sample to households who say they are willing to move. In this subsample, sorting on 
unobserved propensity to move should not be a problem. The results are shown in Appendix 
Table A3. The sample size is small and the estimates vary between specifications, but we 
have negative, and often significant, coefficients for overall mobility, short distance mobility 
and housing- and area-related mobility. For other types of mobility, the coefficients are 
insignificant, apart from two positive and significant coefficients for long distance mobility. 
In our base specification, we fit the same polynomial over the whole range of house values 
and only allow the intercept to change at the cut-off. Restricting the polynomials to be the 
same on both sides of the cut-off can be considered intuitively unappealing, because it 
implies that we use data on the right of the cut-off to estimate the function on the left, and 
vice versa. We therefore estimate a more flexible specification in which we allow the slope of 
the regression line to differ by treatment status. That is, we interact the polynomial of house 
value with the dummy for being above the cut-off. We report results with 1
st
 to 3
rd
 order 
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polynomials of house values in Appendix Table A4. As expected, the standard errors go up in 
some specifications, especially with the 3
nd
 order polynomial. Again, however, all estimates 
for overall mobility, short distance mobility and housing- and area-related mobility are 
negative and most of them are statistically significant. Other types of mobility are unaffected 
by the stamp duty.  
Finally, the central contribution of our study is the analysis of whether the impact of the 
stamp duty varies by type of mobility. The division of moves into short and long distance at 
10km is naturally somewhat arbitrary. We test the robustness of our results to this choice in 
Appendix Figure A2, which shows that the finding that the stamp duty affects short distance 
mobility but not long distance mobility is not altered by different definitions of short and long 
distance. The Figure shows the coefficient on the treatment indicator and the attached 95 
percent confidence interval when we vary the definition of long distance between 5 and 15 
kilometers, using a 40 percent band around the cut-off and a 4
th
 order polynomial of house 
values. The estimated impact on short distance mobility is consistently negative and 
significant, while the effect on long distance mobility is never statistically different from 
zero. 
3.4. Welfare analysis 
To get a sense of the possible magnitude of the adverse welfare effect of the stamp duty due 
to prevented mobility, we calculate estimates of the ratio of the welfare loss of increasing the 
stamp duty rate from 1 to 3 percent to the corresponding revenue-increase.  
There are three caveats. First, our point estimates of the impact of the stamp duty on overall 
mobility are somewhat imprecise. To take account of this imprecision, we report calculations 
with our preferred point estimate plus calculations that are based on the preferred point 
estimate +/- one standard error. Second, the welfare effect depends on assumptions about the 
average utility loss per move relative to the house value. We report estimated welfare effects 
for alternative assumptions. Finally, the point estimates in Table 3 are based on our 
regression sample that excludes recent movers and is constrained to households with house 
values around £250k. Thus our estimated welfare effects may not be representative for the 
entire population. 
With these caveats in mind, we start with the revenue increase due to the tax rate hike. We 
assume that all moves are associated with a transaction and we abstract from capitalization of 
the tax into house prices. We assume that each house sells at the same price 𝑃 and denote the 
total number of houses by 𝑀. 
In our data the mobility rate in the treatment group with a 3% tax rate is 0.044 (40 percent 
band). Thus, the number of transactions (moves) is 0.044×𝑀 and the tax revenue per 
transaction is 0.03×𝑃. The counterfactual mobility rate in the absence of the tax rate hike is 
0.044 minus the estimated effect of the stamp duty increase β1 and revenue per transaction is 
0.01×𝑃. Thus, the additional revenue due to the tax rate increase from 1 to 3 percent is: 
  
19 
 
∆𝑅 = 0.03 × 𝑃 × 0.044 × 𝑀 − 0.01 × 𝑃 × (0.044 – 𝛽1) × 𝑀 .  (2) 
Assuming a -2.6 percentage-point effect (Table 3, 30% band and 3
rd
 order polynomial) for the 
tax rate increase implies a counterfactual mobility rate of 0.07, suggesting that the effect of 
the behavioral response to the tax increase on tax revenue is substantial. In the absence of a 
mobility response (β1 = 0), tax revenue from the affected group would increase by 200%, but 
the mobility response erodes the tax base so strongly that the actual increase is only 89%.  
Next, we consider the utility loss of moves foregone due to the tax rate increase. The stamp 
duty hinders moves because the buyer’s valuation has to exceed the seller’s valuation by the 
amount of the stamp duty liability for a move to take place. We consider no other moving 
costs. Thus, marginal moves prevented by the increase in the stamp duty rate from 0.01 to 
0.03 have a surplus between 0.01 𝑃 and 0.03 𝑃. We denote the ratio of the average welfare 
loss of forgone moves to house values by λ ∈ [0.01, 0.03]. The additional welfare loss due to 
the tax rate increase is the number of prevented moves times the average utility loss per 
prevented move: 
Δ𝑊 =  (𝛽1 × 𝑀) × (λ × 𝑃), (3) 
and the welfare loss of the stamp duty-increase relative to the revenue-increase can be written 
as 
Δ𝑊
Δ𝑅
 =  
𝛽1×λ
0.03×0.044−0.01×(0.044 – 𝛽1)
 . (4) 
We are agnostic about the true λ but assume, as the base scenario, a uniform distribution of 
the surplus of moving between 0.01 𝑃 and 0.03 𝑃. Thus, the average utility loss of a forgone 
move is 0.02 𝑃, i.e. λ = 0.02. (Dachis et al. (2012) assume a uniform distribution of 
valuations of seller and buyer and show that in their setting this implies that the expected 
utility loss of forgone moves is the initial tax liability plus 49.1 percent of the increase in tax 
liability. We do not replicate their model but rather assume directly that, in our base case, the 
average utility loss is the initial tax liability (0.01P) plus 50 percent of the increase in tax 
liability (0.5×0.02P).) We also calculate lower bound estimates for the deadweight loss, 
assuming that the utility loss of all foregone moves equals the lower bound of the range for 
the possible surplus of prevented moves (λ = 0.01).)  
Table 9 reports our estimates for the deadweight loss of the stamp duty-increase relative to 
the revenue-increase based on a set of alternative values for β1 and λ. The second column 
uses our preferred estimate (β1 = -0.026) for the mobility response from Table 3. We include 
welfare estimates for β1 = -0.026 -/+ one standard error in the first and third column as a 
sensitivity check. The assumption regarding the average utility of forgone moves is also 
important. The first row assumes a uniform distribution for the benefits of moving in the 
range affected by the tax rate-increase, and the second row assumes that the benefit equals the 
lower bound of the range.  
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Our calculations – based on our core estimate (β1 = -0.026) and assuming a uniform 
distribution for the utility loss – imply a welfare loss associated with the reduction in mobility 
of 84 percent of the additional revenue generated by the tax rate-increase (Table 9, first row, 
second column). The estimates vary between 24 percent and 132 percent depending on 
assumptions. 
The estimates are an order of magnitude higher than the estimated welfare loss in Dachis et 
al. (2012), who find a 13 percent deadweight loss relative to tax revenue. There are several 
reasons why our estimates differ so vastly from Dachis et al. (2012). First, they compare total 
welfare loss calculated from data that does not cover all transactions to actual tax revenue, 
whereas we calculate directly the ratio of welfare loss to tax revenue without attempting to 
estimate total welfare loss. Second, they compare the estimated welfare loss to revenue raised 
by the new Toronto transfer tax and do not take into account the reduction in the revenue of 
the pre-existing provincial transfer tax when the Toronto tax is introduced. Using the 
numbers reported in Dachis et al. (2012) and basing the revenue estimate to their data instead 
of actual revenue, and incorporating the reduction in the provincial tax revenue, we get a 29 
percent welfare loss relative to revenue-increase.
18
 Third, the deadweight loss increases at an 
accelerating rate as the tax rate increases, and in our analysis the studied tax rate-increase is 
higher (increase from 1 to 3 percent) than in Dachis et al. (2012) who consider a change from 
roughly 1.1 percent to 2.2 percent. Fourth, the estimated impact of the tax rate increase is 
somewhat stronger in our setting. According to their results, a 1.1 percentage-point increase 
in the tax rate caused a 15 percent decline in sales. Using our core estimates to calculate the 
impact of a 1.1 percentage-point increase yields a 20 percent reduction in mobility.
19
  
4. Conclusions 
The previous literature suggests two main channels through which transfer taxes on property 
may have detrimental effects on the functioning of the economy. First, by increasing moving 
costs, the transfer tax may deter the unemployed from taking up jobs far from their residence 
or workers from switching to more productive jobs. Second, the transfer tax can make 
households tolerate larger discrepancies between the characteristics of their actual and the 
desired dwelling before moving. As a result, the match between dwellings and households is 
on average worse than in the absence of the tax. The increased mismatch in the housing 
market may lead to ‘waste’ in the form of misallocation costs due to, for example, expanding 
households living in too small houses and shrinking households living in too large houses. 
                                                          
18
 Dachis et al. (2012) report an average revenue of about $4,400 per transaction for both the pre-existing 
provincial transfer tax and the studied Toronto transfer tax, a welfare loss per forgone transaction of $6,559 and 
a reduction in the number of transactions by 14 percent. If we set the number of transactions before the 
introduction of the transfer tax to 100, then after the introduction of the tax this number goes down to 86 and the 
revenue increase is 86×$8,800 - 100×$4,400. The welfare loss due to prevented transactions is 14×$6,559. The 
ratio of welfare loss to revenue-increase is 14 × $6,559 (86 × $8,800 − 100 × $4,400)⁄  = 0.29. 
19
 We calculate this by assuming that the mobility rate decreases linearly as the tax rate increases. Thus, using 
our core estimate of -0.026 for the impact of a 2 percentage point increase, we get that a 1.1 percentage point 
increase in the tax rate would decrease the mobility rate by 1.1/2 × 0.026 = 0.0143. Dividing this by the 
counterfactual mobility rate of 0.07 gives the proportionate decrease in mobility of 0.0143/0.07 = 0.204.    
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The transfer tax induced increase in moving costs will only have these adverse effects if it 
actually reduces mobility. Our core estimate indicates that a 2 percentage-point increase in 
the British stamp duty indeed reduces household mobility considerably; by 2.6 percentage 
points, implying a reduction in mobility of about 37 percent.  
Our analysis of short and long distance moves indicates that the effect may be solely 
attributable to the stamp duty’s adverse impact on short distance moves, which are typically 
related to adjustments in housing consumption. This implies that the stamp duty may lead 
predominately to misallocation of dwellings in the housing market. Its impact on the 
functioning of the labor market may be fairly limited.  
One interesting feature of the British housing market is the fact that owner-occupier moves 
are comparably rare. During our sample period (1996 to 2007) and based on the full BHPS 
sample (not just our regression sample), the average propensity of a UK owner-occupier 
household to move during a calendar year was only 5.1 percent. This contrasts to the 
household mobility in the United States. Owner-occupier households in the US were more 
than twice as likely to move during our sample period: Based on the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) the propensity of US owner-occupier households to move during a 
calendar year was on average 11.9 percent.
20
 Both, UK and US owner-occupier households 
face housing transfer taxes, though in most US states and municipalities this tax is not very 
substantial. According to our findings, differences in the transfer tax rates alone cannot fully 
explain this difference in mobility rates. In 2007 the average stamp duty rate faced by 
homeowners in the UK was 1.25% (based on the BHPS). A simple application of our 
preferred point estimate to all homeowners suggests that eliminating the stamp duty in the 
UK would increase mobility by 1.4 percentage-points to 6.5%, which is still much lower than 
the mobility rate for owner-occupiers in the US. 
Given the magnitude of the negative effect of the British stamp duty, particularly on short 
distance and housing-related mobility, we conclude that transfer taxes likely have very 
substantial detrimental effects on the functioning of the housing market. This implies that 
transfer taxes on residential properties are an inefficient way of collecting tax revenue. Taxes 
on land (and housing) consumption that apply independently of whether a household moves 
also have real property as the basis of taxation but are less distorting. 
  
                                                          
20
 This propensity is based on the PSID sample used in Hilber and Turner (2014) but confined to owner-
occupier moves between 1996 and 2007.  
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
Stamp duty schedule – During sample period 
Purchase price Stamp duty rate 
Up to £125,000 0% 
Over £125,000 to £250,000 1% 
Over £250,000 to £500,000 3% 
Over £500,000 to £1 million 4% 
Over £1 million 5% 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Summary statistics – 40 percent band around £250k cut-off 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Self assessed house value 19701 220.0 47.5 
Moved between t and t+1 19701 0.044 0.205 
Distance of move less than 10 km 19701 0.024 0.153 
Distance of move 10km or more 19701 0.020 0.141 
Moved mainly for employment reasons 19701 0.002 0.048 
Moved mainly for housing or area reasons 19701 0.020 0.139 
Moved mainly for life event reasons 19701 0.014 0.119 
Round house value (£200k, £250k or £300k) 19701 0.356 0.479 
Children (0/1) 19701 0.319 0.466 
Annual household income 19328 37767 25450 
Age 19446 53.5 14.0 
General Certificate of Education (GCE) A-levels or higher 19021 0.635 0.481 
Bachelor degree or higher 19021 0.195 0.396 
Unemployed 19699 0.009 0.093 
Moved between t-3 and t-2 19047 0.063 0.242 
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TABLE 3 
Stamp duty and mobility 
Dependent variable: household moved (0/1)     
Band around   Order of polynomial of house value   
£250k cutoff No 1st 2nd 3rd 4th N 
20 % -0.007 -0.024 -0.035* -0.03 -0.018 6902 
 
[0.008] [0.023] [0.020] [0.032] [0.028]    
 
 
-1395 -1395 -1398 -1396 -1402 
 30 % 0.002 -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.032**  15322 
 
[0.006] [0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.014]    
 
 
-6016 -6042 -6040 -6044 -6042 
 40 % 0.001 -0.016* -0.022** -0.031*** -0.027**  19701 
 
[0.005] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011]    
   -6526 -6534 -6534 -6540 -6539   
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control variables: 
dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at household level and £5k house value group level in 
brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
 
TABLE 4 
Stamp duty and mobility – Differential effects by distance of move 
Type of move Distance of move < 10km Distance of move >10km 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value   
£250k cut-off 3rd 4th 3rd 4th N 
20 % -0.052** -0.039* 0.022 0.021 6902 
 
[0.024] [0.022] [0.018] [0.018] 
 
 
-5556 -5569 -6478 -6476 
 30 % -0.035*** -0.045*** 0.009 0.013 15322 
 
[0.005] [0.011] [0.007] [0.01]    
 
 
-15402 -15403 -17263 -17262 
 40 % -0.035*** -0.038*** 0.004 0.011 19701 
 
[0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008]    
   -18222 -18221 -21337 -21338   
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control variables: 
dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at household level and £5k house value group level in 
brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
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TABLE 5 
Stamp duty and mobility – Differential effects by primary reason of move 
Type of move Housing and area Employment Life events   
Band around   Order of polynomial of house value   
£250k cut-off 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 3rd 4th N 
20 % -0.026 -0.019 0.006 0.004 -0.005 0.000 6902 
 
[0.022] [0.025] [0.005] [0.005] [0.017] [0.018] 
 
 
-6906 -6909 -21488 -21490 -10152 -10154 
 30 % -0.022*** -0.023** 0.002 0.001 -0.007 -0.018*   15322 
 
[0.006] [0.009] [0.002] [0.003] [0.006] [0.010]    
 
 
-18493 -18491 -52610 -52608 -23741 -23745 
 40 % -0.023*** -0.022*** 0.000 0.002 -0.009 -0.007 19701 
 
[0.007] [0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006] [0.007]    
   -21855 -21853 -63947 -63946 -27986 -27984   
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control 
variables: dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at household level and £5k house 
value group level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown 
in italics. 
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TABLE 6 
Stamp duty and mobility – Observations close to £250k dropped (donut estimates) 
Excluded house values       
£250k   £245k-£255k £240k-£260k 
Order of polynomial of house value     
3rd 4th 3rd 4th 3rd 4th 
Panel A: Overall mobility 
-0.036* -0.032* -0.030 -0.025 -0.060* -0.053*   
[0.020] [0.016] [0.020] [0.016] [0.032] [0.027]    
-5572 -5570 -5627 -5626 -5315 -5314 
Panel B: Distance of move < 10km   
-0.044*** -0.046*** -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.060** -0.064*** 
[0.013] [0.010] [0.013] [0.010] [0.026] [0.022]    
-16212 -16210 -16255 -16253 -15320 -15318 
Panel C: Distance of move > 10km     
0.008 0.014 0.011 0.017 0.000 0.011 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.011] [0.014] [0.016]    
-18482 -18483 -18412 -18413 -17468 -17470 
Panel D: Housing- and area-related mobility   
-0.028** -0.026** -0.024* -0.022* -0.039* -0.034*   
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.022] [0.020]    
-19280 -19278 -19306 -19304 -17932 -17930 
Panel E: Employment-related mobility   
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.006] 
-56202 -56200 -55766 -55764 -52307 -52306 
Panel F: Life event-related mobility   
-0.001 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.006 
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.014] [0.015]    
-24837 -24835 -24792 -24790 -23185 -23183 
N=17563   N=17459   N=16533   
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). All specifications use 
a 40 percent band around the £250k cut-off. Additional control variables: dummy for round house 
value. Standard errors clustered at household level and £5k house value group level in brackets. * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
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TABLE 7 
Balance of covariates tests 
Panel A: 1st order polynomial of house value       
Band around 
£250k cut-off Age 
Kids  
(0/1) 
Ln(hh 
 income) 
Gce A- 
levels  
or higher 
Bachelor  
degree  
or higher 
Un- 
employed 
Moved  
t-3 to t-2 
30% 1.678** -0.037 -0.012 -0.006 -0.004 0.053 0.72 
 
[0.803] [0.027] [0.019] [0.017] [0.003] [1.306] [0.633] 
40% -0.028 -0.015 0.004 -0.003 -0.015 -0.016 -0.005 
  [0.026] [0.017] [0.016] [0.003] [1.212] [0.010]    [0.014]    
Panel B: 2nd order polynomial of house value       
Band around 
£250k cut-off Age 
Kids  
(0/1) 
Ln(hh  
income) 
Gce A- 
levels  
or higher 
Bachelor  
degree  
or higher 
Un- 
employed 
Moved  
t-3 to t-2 
30% 1.071 0.008 0.009 0.025 -0.001 -0.624 0.899 
 
[1.200] [0.034] [0.024] [0.023] [0.004] [1.497] [0.937] 
40% 0.015 -0.005 0.012 -0.001 -0.122 -0.009 0.022 
  [0.030] [0.022] [0.020] [0.003] [1.340] [0.014]    [0.015]    
Panel C: 3rd order polynomial of house value       
Band around 
£250k cut-off Age 
Kids  
(0/1) 
Ln(hh  
income) 
Gce A- 
levels  
or higher 
Bachelor  
degree  
or higher 
Un- 
employed 
Moved  
t-3 to t-2 
30% 0.236 0.02 0.041 0.02 0.03 -0.002 0.011 
 
[1.033] [0.024] [0.035] [0.023] [0.021] [0.004] [0.014] 
40% 1.577 -0.002 0.007 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 
  [1.066] [0.025] [0.031] [0.021] [0.019] [0.004] [0.014]    
Panel D: 4th order polynomial of house value       
Band around 
£250k cut-off Age 
Kids  
(0/1) 
Ln(hh  
income) 
Gce A- 
levels  
or higher 
Bachelor  
degree  
or higher 
Un- 
employed 
Moved  
t-3 to t-2 
30% -0.279 0.053 0.019 0.04 0.047 -0.001 0.011 
 
[1.777] [0.034] [0.051] [0.033] [0.029] [0.006] [0.025] 
40% -0.258 0.038 0.027 0.019 0.029 -0.003 0.022 
  [1.278] [0.031] [0.040] [0.026] [0.023] [0.005] [0.015]    
N (30% band) 14703 14885 14605 14387 14387 14884 14437 
N (40% band) 18918 19139 18789 18530 18530 19138 18535 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control variables: 
dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at household level and £5k house value group level in 
brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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TABLE 8 
Stamp duty and mobility – Controls added 
Panel A: 3rd order polynomial of house value     
Band 
around All moves 
Short 
moves 
Long 
moves 
Housing 
and area 
moves 
Employment 
moves 
Life event 
moves 
£250k cut-
off       
    30 % -0.024*** -0.032*** 0.008 -0.021*** 0.002 -0.006 N=14225 
 
[0.010] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.002] [0.006] 
 
 
-5704 -14361 -16035 -16782 -49354 -21762 
 40 % -0.026*** -0.032*** 0.006 -0.020*** 0.002 -0.007 N=18296 
  [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.002]      [0.007]    
 
 
-6306 -16880 -20150 -20047 -61629 -25647 
 Panel B: 4th order polynomial of house value     
Band 
around All moves 
Short  
moves 
Long 
moves 
Housing  
and area 
moves 
Employment 
moves 
Life event  
moves 
£250k cut-
off             
 30 % -0.028** -0.042*** 0.014 -0.021** 0.002 -0.017* N=14225 
 
[0.014] [0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.003] [0.010] 
 
 
-5703 -14364 -16036 -16782 -49364 -21768 
 40 % -0.026*** -0.037*** 0.012 -0.022*** 0.002 -0.006 N=18296 
  [0.011] [0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.003]     [0.008]    
   -6312 -16879 -20152 -20051 -61629 -25647   
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control variables: 
year dummies, dummy for round house value, age, household income, dummy for kids, 18 region dummies, 
dummy for GCE A-levels, dummy for bachelor degree or higher and dummy for unemployed, dummy for 
moved between t-3 and t-2. Standard errors clustered at household level and £5k house value group level in 
brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
 
TABLE 9 
Welfare effects of the stamp duty increase from 1% to 3%  
(the ratio of welfare loss to revenue increase) 
 Average utility loss per move  
(proportion of house value) 
Impact of stamp duty increase on mobility 
β1 = -0.017 β1 = -0.026 β1 = -0.035 
λ = 0.02 (uniform distribution) 0.479 0.839 1.321 
λ = 0.01 (lower bound) 0.239 0.419 0.660 
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Figures 
 
FIGURE 1 
Distribution of self-assessed house values in 2006 (excluding recent movers) 
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FIGURE 2 
Mobility and self-assessed house values 
 
Notes: Circles indicate mobility rate in £10k bins after controlling for round values divisible by £50k. The size of the circle is proportionate to the 
number of observations in the bin. The line shows the fit of a regression of a mover dummy on a dummy for self-assessed house value above 
£250k, a 4
th
 order polynomial for the whole range and a dummy for round values divisible by £50k. The gray area is the 95 % confidence interval. 
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FIGURE 3  
Placebo tests with artificial cut-offs  
(Specification: 30% band and 3rd order polynomial, Outcome: all moves) 
 
Notes: The figure shows the coefficients on placebo treatment dummies and the attached 95 percent confidence 
intervals for artificial cut-offs at £5k intervals between £150k and £350k (blue circles) where stamp duty does 
not change, and the actual cut-off at £250k (red square) where the stamp duty jumps from 1% to 3%. The 
sample used in each regression includes house values +/- 30% of the respective cut-off value. Controls include a 
3
rd
 order polynomial of house value and a dummy for round values divisible by £50k. 
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FIGURE 4 
Placebo tests with artificial cut-offs  
(Specification: 40% band and 4
th
 order polynomial, Outcome: all moves) 
 
Notes: The figure shows the coefficients on placebo treatments and the attached 95 percent confidence intervals 
for artificial cut-offs at £5k intervals between £150k and £350k (blue circles), and the actual cut-off at £250k 
(red square). The sample used in each regression includes house values +/- 40% of the respective cut-off value. 
Controls include a 4
th
 order polynomial of house value and a dummy for round values divisible by £50k. 
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Appendix 
 
 
APPENDIX TABLE A1 
Construction of type of move variables 
  Job-related moves 
Housing- and area- 
related moves 
Major life event- 
related moves 
Did you move for reasons that were wholly or partly to do with your own job, or employment 
opportunities? 
 
YES NO NO 
 
and/or and and 
What were your (other) main reasons for moving? 
 
Job reason, self Larger accommodation Move in with partner 
 
Job reason, other Smaller accommodation Split from partner 
 
 Own accommodation Move in with family 
 
(If other than job reasons given,  Buy accommodation Move from family 
 
not included in any category) No stairs Move in with friend 
  
Another type Closer to family or friends 
  
Disliked previous accommodation Move to college 
  
Better accommodation Left college 
  
Privacy Retirement 
  
Wants change Evicted, repossessed 
  
Disliked isolation Health reasons 
  
To rural environment 
 
  
From rural environment 
  
Traffic 
  
Area unsafe 
 
  
Noise 
 
  
Area unfriendly 
 
  
To specific place 
     Disliked area   
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APPENDIX TABLE A2 
Balancing tests for predicted mobility 
Dependent variable: Predicted moving probability (0/1) 
Band around Order of polynomial of house value   
£250k cut-off 1st 2nd 3rd 4th N 
20 % -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 6553 
 
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]    
 
 
-14830 -14829 -14829 -14829 
 30 % -0.002* -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 14406 
 
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]    
 
 
-65074 -65073 -65074 -65074 
 40 % -0.001 -0.003 -0.004** -0.001 18534 
 
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]    
   -79025 -79034 -79048 -79060   
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control 
variables: dummy for round house value. Standard errors clustered at household level and £5k house 
value group level in brackets. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in 
italics. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A3 
Stamp duty and mobility – Sample includes  
only households saying they would like to move 
Panel A: 3rd order polynomial of house value       
Band around 
All 
moves 
Short 
moves 
Long 
moves 
Housing and  
area moves 
Employment 
moves 
Life event  
moves 
£250k cut-off       
    30 % -0.076* -0.119*** 0.043 -0.054** -0.003 -0.023 N= 
2966 
 
[0.043] [0.024] [0.029] [0.025] [0.006] [0.026]    
 
1598 -39 -510 -103 -7938 -1408 
 40 % -0.101** -0.112*** 0.011 -0.068*** -0.007 -0.037 N= 
4025   [0.040] [0.022] [0.029] [0.024] [0.006] [0.026]    
 
2376 193 -498 133 -9750 -1507 
 Panel B: 4th order polynomial of house value       
Band around 
All 
moves 
Short 
moves 
Long 
moves 
Housing and  
area moves 
Employment 
moves 
Life event  
moves 
£250k cut-off             
 30 % -0.034 -0.150*** 0.117*** -0.055 -0.001 -0.044 N= 
2966 
 
[0.049] [0.034] [0.040] [0.034] [0.007] [0.033]    
 
1598 -39 -522 -101 -7936 -1408 
 40 % -0.06 -0.125*** 0.065** -0.054* -0.003 -0.019 N= 
4025   [0.040] [0.025] [0.033] [0.029] [0.008] [0.029]    
  2374 195 -509 135 -9749 -1507   
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control variables: 
dummy for round house value divisible by £50k. Standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A4 
Stamp duty and mobility – Coefficients on nth order polynomials  
allowed to vary on different sides of cut-off 
Panel A: 1st order polynomial of house value       
Band around 
All  
Moves 
Short 
Moves 
Long  
Moves 
Housing and  
area moves 
Employment 
moves 
Life event 
moves 
£250k cut-off       
    30 % -0.037*** -0.041*** 0.004 -0.027*** 0.000 -0.003 N= 
15322 
 
[0.011] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.003] [0.007]    
 
-6041 -15403 -17260 -18494 -52609 -23742 
 40 % -0.019* -0.026*** 0.007 -0.015* 0.001 -0.004 N= 
19701   [0.010] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.002] [0.006]    
 
-6532 -18209 -21339 -21843 -63949 -27983 
 Panel B: 2nd order polynomial of house value       
Band around 
All  
Moves 
Short 
Moves 
Long  
Moves 
Housing and  
area moves 
Employment 
moves 
Life event 
moves 
£250k cut-off             
 30 % -0.016 -0.035*** 0.020 -0.018 0.001 -0.012 N= 
15322 
 
[0.018] [0.011] [0.014] [0.011] [0.004] [0.009]    
 
-6041 -15399 -17261 -18491 -52607 -23741 
 40 % -0.037** -0.049*** 0.012 -0.030*** 0.000 -0.006 N= 
19701   [0.015] [0.009] [0.012] [0.009] [0.003] [0.008]    
 
-6537 -18221 -21336 -21852 -63945 -27985 
 Panel B: 3rd order polynomial of house value       
Band around 
All  
Moves 
Short 
Moves 
Long  
Moves 
Housing and  
area moves 
Employment 
moves 
Life event 
moves 
£250k cut-off             
 30 % -0.029 -0.024 -0.005 -0.039*** -0.006 0.000 N= 
15322 
 
[0.026] [0.016] [0.022] [0.014] [0.007] [0.013]    
 
-6050 -15409 -17262 -18493 -52606 -23762 
 40 % -0.019 -0.027*** 0.008 -0.024* -0.003 -0.012 N= 
19701   [0.024] [0.014] [0.019] [0.012] [0.006] [0.013]    
  -6537 -18221 -21334 -21851 -63943 -27982   
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the treatment indicator (house value>$250k). Additional control variables: 
dummy for round house value divisible by £50k. Standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Akaike Information Criterion is shown in italics. 
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APPENDIX FIGURE A1 
Predicted mobility and self-assessed house values 
 
Notes: Circles indicate predicted mobility rate in £10k bins from a regression of a mover dummy on the 
following covariates: age (and its square), dummy for kids, log of household income (and its square), dummy 
for GCE A-levels, dummy for bachelor degree or higher, dummy for unemployed and dummy for moved 
between t-3 and t-2. The size of circle is proportionate to the number of observations in the bin. The line 
indicates the fit of a regression of predicted mobility on a dummy for self-assessed house value above £250k, a 
4
th
 order polynomial of house value and a dummy for round values divisible by £50k. The gray area is the 95 % 
confidence interval.  
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APPENDIX FIGURE A2 
Robustness of results on long/short distance mobility to definition of long/short distance 
moves (Specification: 40% band and 4
th
 order polynomial) 
 
Notes: The figure shows the coefficient on the treatment indicator and the attached 95 percent confidence 
interval for long distance mobility (red dots) and short distance mobility (blue dots) when we vary the definition 
of long/short distance between 5 and 15 kilometers., using a 40 percent band around the cut-off and a 4th order 
polynomial of house value. 
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